John Major praised Gulf ruler\u2019s power grab, newly declassified files...<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\nUkraine\u2019s sovereignty questioned<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIn the event, there was a messy compromise. Crimea\u2019s parliament declared independence, while also acknowledging Ukraine\u2019s authority. Yet the situation remained volatile. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Major\u2019s foreign policy advisor and former ambassador<\/a> to Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite, wrote a confidential background note that would today be considered heretical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\u201cIt is not entirely clear, even to the Ukrainians, still less to the Russians, that Ukraine is a real country,\u201d Braithwaite noted. \u201cHence the tensions between the two.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Braithwaite, who went on to chair the Joint Intelligence Committee later in 1992, gave the Prime Minister a potted history of the region, stretching back to the middle ages. He highlighted the \u201cartificial famine which [Soviet leader Joseph] Stalin imposed on the Ukraine in 1930-31, when many millions of peasants were deported or starved to death.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cSo it was not surprising then very many Ukrainians greeted the Germans as liberators in 1941, and that large numbers agreed to join the German army\u201d, Braithwaite reasoned, referring to Nazi collaborators during World War II. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIt is not entirely clear\u2026that Ukraine is a real country\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u2018An integral part of Russia\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nAlthough these resistance groups were ultimately defeated by Stalin, Ukrainian nationalism survived as a political movement. \u201cThroughout 1990 the number and size of popular demonstrations for independence swelled,\u201d Braithwaite noted, adding that Russia looked like an \u201cempire\u201d to Ukrainians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, he said: \u201cRussians would simply not recognise the picture. For Russians, the Ukraine is an integral part of Russia, its history and its culture. The Ukrainian language is no more than a dialect\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He went on: \u201cI have not met a single Russian, even among the most sophisticated, who really believes that the Ukraine is now permanently severed from the motherland.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a candid remark, Braithwaite said: \u201cThe Ukrainians know that. They also know that Ukraine itself is divided: between the ultra-nationalist\u2026Western Ukraine\u2026and the East which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Russians.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As tensions escalated, a confidential Whitehall planning paper warned: \u201cWe need to pay more attention to Ukraine.\u201d It noted there were \u201cfears over long term allegiance of ethnic Russian minority (22% of population)\u201d and concerns that President Yeltsin \u201cwill be replaced by nationalists\/neo-imperialists\u201d in the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n RELATED<\/h3>\n \n \n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n \n When Tony Blair backed Putin\u2019s brutal war<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\u2018Reabsorbed by Russia\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nAt the end of 1993, Foreign Office planners thought \u201cUkraine might be reabsorbed by Russia unless it faced up to the need for painful economic and political reforms\u201d to make it less dependent on money from Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine\u2019s deputy foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, did not dispute the analysis when British diplomats came to Kiev to meet him in early 1994 for \u201csome six hours of confidential exchanges\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tarasyuk believed Moscow \u201cwas determined to try to assert as much control as possible over all the republics of the former Soviet Union\u201d, and would \u201cuse the well tried strategy of destabilising their neighbours in order to justify intervention\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Ukrainian politician was apparently \u201cparticularly exercised about the Crimea where recent elections have demonstrated the strength of pro-Russian separatist feeling.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Roger Bone, a senior British diplomat who would later run arms giant Boeing, \u201creassured Tarasyuk that the West was very much alive to the risk of a shift in Russian foreign policy\u201d and \u201cwould not acquiesce in the re-establishment of a Russian sphere of influence.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Battle for influence<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nPlans were made to bring Ukraine\u2019s economy into the Western orbit, through promoting privatisation and engagement with the International Monetary Fund. Financial aid was to be conditional on Ukraine restructuring its economy towards a free market model. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It would take another 20 or 30 years for the significance of these discussions to become fully apparent. In 2014, Ukraine\u2019s democratically elected president was toppled in a popular \u201ccoup<\/a>\u201d, after he opted for an economic deal with Russia instead of the European Union.<\/p>\n\n\n\nRussia, now led by the nationalist Vladimir Putin, reacted to the loss of his ally by annexing Crimea. Residents supposedly voted by 97% to join Russia in a referendum, which was boycotted by Tartars and not recognised by Britain. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Meanwhile, Moscow helped destabilise Ukraine\u2019s eastern Donbas region, by backing separatist rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk. Peace talks failed and the conflict dramatically escalated this February when Putin launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Putin is now repeating his referendum tactic by holding disputed polls in the Donbas, despite the ongoing war. While British intelligence has recently won credit for predicting the conflict, the declassified files make clear this was a risk Whitehall had long known about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
In the event, there was a messy compromise. Crimea\u2019s parliament declared independence, while also acknowledging Ukraine\u2019s authority. Yet the situation remained volatile. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Major\u2019s foreign policy advisor and former ambassador<\/a> to Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite, wrote a confidential background note that would today be considered heretical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt is not entirely clear, even to the Ukrainians, still less to the Russians, that Ukraine is a real country,\u201d Braithwaite noted. \u201cHence the tensions between the two.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Braithwaite, who went on to chair the Joint Intelligence Committee later in 1992, gave the Prime Minister a potted history of the region, stretching back to the middle ages. He highlighted the \u201cartificial famine which [Soviet leader Joseph] Stalin imposed on the Ukraine in 1930-31, when many millions of peasants were deported or starved to death.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSo it was not surprising then very many Ukrainians greeted the Germans as liberators in 1941, and that large numbers agreed to join the German army\u201d, Braithwaite reasoned, referring to Nazi collaborators during World War II. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt is not entirely clear\u2026that Ukraine is a real country\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Although these resistance groups were ultimately defeated by Stalin, Ukrainian nationalism survived as a political movement. \u201cThroughout 1990 the number and size of popular demonstrations for independence swelled,\u201d Braithwaite noted, adding that Russia looked like an \u201cempire\u201d to Ukrainians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other hand, he said: \u201cRussians would simply not recognise the picture. For Russians, the Ukraine is an integral part of Russia, its history and its culture. The Ukrainian language is no more than a dialect\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He went on: \u201cI have not met a single Russian, even among the most sophisticated, who really believes that the Ukraine is now permanently severed from the motherland.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a candid remark, Braithwaite said: \u201cThe Ukrainians know that. They also know that Ukraine itself is divided: between the ultra-nationalist\u2026Western Ukraine\u2026and the East which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Russians.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n As tensions escalated, a confidential Whitehall planning paper warned: \u201cWe need to pay more attention to Ukraine.\u201d It noted there were \u201cfears over long term allegiance of ethnic Russian minority (22% of population)\u201d and concerns that President Yeltsin \u201cwill be replaced by nationalists\/neo-imperialists\u201d in the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the end of 1993, Foreign Office planners thought \u201cUkraine might be reabsorbed by Russia unless it faced up to the need for painful economic and political reforms\u201d to make it less dependent on money from Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine\u2019s deputy foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, did not dispute the analysis when British diplomats came to Kiev to meet him in early 1994 for \u201csome six hours of confidential exchanges\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tarasyuk believed Moscow \u201cwas determined to try to assert as much control as possible over all the republics of the former Soviet Union\u201d, and would \u201cuse the well tried strategy of destabilising their neighbours in order to justify intervention\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Ukrainian politician was apparently \u201cparticularly exercised about the Crimea where recent elections have demonstrated the strength of pro-Russian separatist feeling.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Roger Bone, a senior British diplomat who would later run arms giant Boeing, \u201creassured Tarasyuk that the West was very much alive to the risk of a shift in Russian foreign policy\u201d and \u201cwould not acquiesce in the re-establishment of a Russian sphere of influence.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Plans were made to bring Ukraine\u2019s economy into the Western orbit, through promoting privatisation and engagement with the International Monetary Fund. Financial aid was to be conditional on Ukraine restructuring its economy towards a free market model. <\/p>\n\n\n\n It would take another 20 or 30 years for the significance of these discussions to become fully apparent. In 2014, Ukraine\u2019s democratically elected president was toppled in a popular \u201ccoup<\/a>\u201d, after he opted for an economic deal with Russia instead of the European Union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia, now led by the nationalist Vladimir Putin, reacted to the loss of his ally by annexing Crimea. Residents supposedly voted by 97% to join Russia in a referendum, which was boycotted by Tartars and not recognised by Britain. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, Moscow helped destabilise Ukraine\u2019s eastern Donbas region, by backing separatist rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk. Peace talks failed and the conflict dramatically escalated this February when Putin launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Putin is now repeating his referendum tactic by holding disputed polls in the Donbas, despite the ongoing war. While British intelligence has recently won credit for predicting the conflict, the declassified files make clear this was a risk Whitehall had long known about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\u2018An integral part of Russia\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
RELATED<\/h3>\n
When Tony Blair backed Putin\u2019s brutal war<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Reabsorbed by Russia\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Battle for influence<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n