Torture \u2018for your amusement\u2019: How Thatcher\u2019s government misled MPs and...<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\u2018Good relations\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nBritish planners in London and Santiago, Chile\u2019s capital, immediately set about forging good relations with the new military rulers as repression increased, even secretly conniving with the junta to mislead the British public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Officials were completely aware of the scale of atrocities. Three days after the coup, ambassador Reginald Second\u00e9 reported to the Foreign Office that \u201cit is likely that casualties run into the thousands, certainly it has been far from a bloodless coup\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“The extent of the bloodshed has shocked people”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Six days after, he noted that \u201cstories of military excesses and mounting casualties have begun increasingly to circulate. The extent of the bloodshed has shocked people\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But it did not appear to shock Second\u00e9 and his staff in Santiago. He immediately reported that \u201cwe still have enough at stake in economic relations with Chile to require good relations with the government in power\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But he suggested those good relations should be kept secret, writing: \u201cIt would not be in anyone\u2019s interests to identify too closely with those responsible for the coup\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Orderly government\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nAfter cabling London about casualties reaching into the thousands, Second\u00e9 further told the Foreign Office that \u201cwhatever the excesses of the military during the coup\u201d the Allende government had been leading the country into \u201ceconomic ruin\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, Britain should welcome the new rulers since “there is every reason to suppose that they will now\u2026 try to impose a period of sensible, orderly government”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Indeed, Second\u00e9 effectively condoned the political repression, noting that \u201cthe lack of political activity is, for the time being, no loss\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ambassador also told the Foreign Office that \u201cmost British businessmen\u2026 will be overjoyed at the prospect of consolidation which the new military regime offers\u201d. British companies, such as Shell, he added, \u201care all breathing deep sighs of relief\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The reference was to Allende\u2019s nationalisation campaign that had taken over some key Western commercial interests in the country, notably copper, the country\u2019s principal economic resource. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cNow is the time to get in\u201d, he recommended, while urging the British government to provide early diplomatic recognition of the new regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Better prospect\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThe foreign secretary in Edward Heath\u2019s Conservative government, Alec Douglas Home, sent an official \u2018guidance\u2019 memorandum to various British embassies on 21 September outlining British support for the new junta. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It said: \u201cFor British interests\u2026 there is no doubt that Chile under the junta is a better prospect than Allende\u2019s chaotic road to socialism, our investments should do better, our loans may be successfully rescheduled, and export credits later resumed, and the sky-high price of copper (important to us) should fall as Chilean production is restored\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Indeed, the Foreign Office decided to go to extraordinary lengths to assure the Chilean junta of Britain\u2019s desire for good relations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“They are anxious to enter early into good relations with the new government”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Eleven days after the coup, Second\u00e9 met Admiral Huerta, the junta\u2019s new foreign minister. The ambassador\u2019s briefing notes for this meeting state that: \u201cI shall put it to him frankly that HMG [Her Majesty\u2019s Government] understands the problems which the Chilean armed forces faced before the coup and are now facing: this is a particular reason why they are anxious to enter early into good relations with the new government\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then Second\u00e9 said he would refer to \u201cour own problems of public opinion at home. It would therefore help us if he [ie, Huerta] could agree that we should be able to say something to reassure public opinion at home\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second\u00e9\u2019s record of his meeting with Huerta confirms that he said that the British government \u201cunderstood the motives of the armed forces, intervention and the problems facing the military government\u201d \u2013 diplomatic language for support for the junta. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The British ambassador then gave Huerta a draft form of wording to be used in public by the UK government, to which Huerta was asked to agree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Agreed statement<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThis agreed statement was an apologia for what the military junta was then doing, undertaken in order to placate public opinion in Britain. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It said Britain accepted that the internal situation in Chile \u201cis of course a matter for the Chilean government only\u201d and that the UK ambassador had expressed \u201cthe very strong feeling which exists in many quarters in Britain over the deaths of President Allende and others and over the many people arrested\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It added that \u201cthe Chilean government offered assurances that they will deal in a humane manner\u201d with those in detention and in political opposition \u2013 an obvious lie, since Second\u00e9 and Whitehall were perfectly aware of the scale of atrocities being committed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Douglas Home was delighted with Second\u00e9\u2019s success in reaching agreement with the junta on a form of words. He cabled the ambassador praising him for carrying out a \u201cdifficult brief\u201d, adding: \u201cThe statement helped us to defend our relatively early recognition of the new government against domestic criticism\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n RELATED<\/h3>\n \n \n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n \n Exclusive: Secret cables reveal Britain interfered with elections in Chile<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\u2018Proper perspective\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThe removal of the democratically elected government was explained away by Second\u00e9. He said in a reflective 20 page dispatch three weeks after the coup that \u201cthe overthrow of constitutional government was not what it may seem in Britain\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
While he recognised that the armed forces were being widely condemned internationally \u201cthis must be put into its proper perspective\u201d, Second\u00e9 added. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
His analysis referred to the regular defeats Allende\u2019s government suffered in the Congress and the government\u2019s retention of power on the basis of the 36 per cent of the vote won by Allende in the 1970 presidential election, which, Second\u00e9 was convinced, would never happen in Britain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“The prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighter”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
As for the new military junta, Second\u00e9 noted that \u201ccircumstances also will push them into directions which British public opinion will deplore\u201d and \u201cthe next few years may be grey ones, in which freedom of expression may suffer\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBut this regime suits British interests much better than its predecessor\u201d, he concluded, adding: \u201cThe prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighter under the new regime\u2026 The new leaders are unequivocally on our side and want to do business, in the widest sense, with us\u201d\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was in the context of clear recognition by British planners that \u201ctorture is going on in Chile\u201d and also of the \u201callegedly quasi-fascist inclination of the new leaders\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was also recognised, as Second\u00e9 noted above, that the new regime was going to continue to be repressive for a long while. As one Foreign Office official noted: \u201cIt seems very hard to foresee a return for many years to anything like democratic government of the kind to which Chile has been accustomed for many years to come\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Aiding the regime<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nForeign minister Leo Amery made clear in private meetings with Judith Hart, Labour\u2019s shadow minister for overseas development, that the UK aid programme and credit lines would not be suspended, as some donors had done. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In reply to a parliamentary question, the Foreign Office drafted: \u201cOur priorities in Latin America are determined largely by our trading and investment interests\u2026 On the recent events in Chile, our public policy is to refuse to be drawn into the controversy of the rights or wrongs of President Allende\u2019s government or the new military government\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The issue of British arms exports to the junta was especially pertinent since Hawker Hunter aircraft supplied by Britain had been used in the coup to attack Allende\u2019s presidential palace and his residence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ambassador noted that \u201cHawker Hunters swept down with their aerial rockets, directed with remarkable accuracy at the palace, which was severely damaged and set on fire\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With the junta in power, British officials made clear that arms contracts agreed with Allende would be honoured, involving eight Hawker Hunters and other equipment worth over \u00a350m. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But they went further, saying in the secret files that \u201cwe shall want in due course to make the most of the opportunities which will be presented by the change in government\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Expectations were for new requests for arms from the junta but \u201cwe shall wish to play these as quietly as possible for some time to come\u201d owing to widespread public opposition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Heath government defied calls from the Labour party to impose an arms embargo on Chile and all the Hawker Hunters had been delivered by the time of the 1974 British general election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A further major task was to counter the British and international opposition to the military regime\u2019s atrocities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n RELATED<\/h3>\n \n \n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n \n Britain\u2019s 42 coups since 1945<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\u2018Atrocity stories\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nOne extraordinary note by Foreign Office official Hugh Carless to Second\u00e9, in December 1973, stated that \u201cunfortunately, there is (as you have pointed out to us) a good deal of fact behind the atrocity stories and that alone makes it impossible for us to counter the propaganda\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe can do little about the press\u201d, he added \u201cbut you can assure them [the Chilean junta] that we and our ministers do understand the facts\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Carless also mused that \u201cChileans must be wondering why on Earth\u2026 so much unfair attention is being paid to their change of government\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
He continued by noting that due to the emergence of a worldwide Chile Solidarity Movement protesting against the new regime, \u201cwe shall, occasionally, have to adopt a lower profile than we would like\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was especially the case in providing arms, helping the junta with debt relief and to \u201crescue them from being pilloried in international meetings\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
‘Violent revolution’<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThe impact of the coup on Chileans was harsh. But the removal of a popular government may also have had another effect beyond the country, signalling that a peaceful, democratic path to improving the position of the poor in a developing country would be met by violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ambassador Second\u00e9 noted in a dispatch after the coup that \u201cthe final seal of failure has now been put on this experiment by the Chilean armed forces\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“The final seal of failure has now been put on this experiment by the Chilean armed forces”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThis has some obvious advantages\u201d, he noted, but also disadvantages, one of which was that \u201cit will be widely concluded that violent revolution is the only effective way to communism\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Douglas Home similarly suggested that \u201cthe overthrow of Allende has ruined prospects for social change to be achieved democratically in Latin America\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Our major interest in Chile is copper\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nA Foreign Office brief noted that \u201cour major interest in Chile is copper\u201d which accounted for one third of the UK\u2019s copper imports. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The disruption in Chile under Allende and \u201cfear for the future\u201d had recently meant large rises in copper prices which were costing the UK an extra \u00a3500,000 in foreign exchange. \u201cWe therefore have a major interest in Chile regaining stability, regardless of politics\u201d, the Foreign Office stated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Allende\u2019s primary heresy as seen from London and Washington was nationalisation. In July 1971 the copper industry \u2013 which provided 70 per cent of Chile\u2019s export earnings \u2013 was fully nationalised and the US-owned copper mines taken over by the government, with the unanimous approval of the Congress. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The US reacted sharply and cut off all credit and new aid to the government and pressed the World Bank to do the same. The chief US mining corporations, Kennecott and Anaconda, began legal proceedings against the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The US ambassador, Nathaniel Davis, told Reginald Second\u00e9 that the US government was concerned \u201cnot only about the loss to the copper companies, but also about the precedent that the Chilean action would set for the nationalisation of other big American interests throughout the developing world\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Several banks were also nationalised while in early 1972 the government announced its intention to take over 91 key firms which accounted for around half of Chile\u2019s economic output. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
A British Conservative Party briefing paper noted that UK companies had been affected by nationalisation \u201cbut it was generally considered at the time that where nationalisation of British assets had taken place the compensation agreed upon had been fair\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a despatch just eight days before the coup, Second\u00e9 admitted that Chile \u201c\u2018has at least caught her social problems by the tail: many people in the poorer and most depressed sections of the community have, as a result of President Allende\u2019s administration, attained a new status and at least tasted, during its early days, a better standard of living, though it has been eroded by inflation\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second\u00e9 concluded that \u201cthis is a major achievement and has set Chile apart from most other Latin American states\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n RELATED<\/h3>\n \n \n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n \n CIA discussed assassination of Fidel Castro with UK officials<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\nThreat of a good example<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nYet it was precisely because Allende\u2019s government was being successful that British and US planners wanted him to be removed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After being elected in 1970, Allende was appointed president of a Popular Unity government with the consent of the Christian Democratic Party. He inherited an economy that, as in most of Latin America, was controlled by a small elite. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In his victory speech in November 1970 Allende proclaimed a programme for fundamental economic change, proposing to abolish the monopolies \u201cwhich grant control of the economy to a few dozen families\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
He also pledged to abolish the tax system that favoured the rich, abolish the \u201clarge estates which condemn thousands of peasants to serfdom\u201d and \u201cput an end to the foreign ownership of our industry\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe road to socialism lies through democracy, pluralism and freedom\u201d, Allende proclaimed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The strategy was to create a restructured society based on state, mixed and private ownership of resources to be achieved mainly through the rapid extension of state control over large parts of the economy, either by direct nationalisation or government investment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
These policies improved the position of the poor, especially in the early part of the Allende presidency, through raising the minimum wage and special bonuses paid to poorly paid workers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was matched by rising popularity for the government; in congressional elections in the year of the coup, 1973, the Popular Unity coalition increased its vote to 44 per cent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n RELATED<\/h3>\n \n \n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n \n Britain\u2019s hidden hand in Brazil\u2019s 1964 coup d\u2019etat<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n\u2018Redistribution of income\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nBritain\u2019s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) recognised \u201cthe Allende government has been directing its economic efforts primarily at effecting a redistribution of income\u201d in which prices had been held down and salaries allowed to rise. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The strategy was \u201cto put right what they regard as economic and social injustices (including foreign domination of certain sectors of the economy)\u201d. Allende was \u201ccommitted to proving that socialism can be brought to Chile in a peaceful and democratic fashion\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Just three months after Allende assumed office, the JIC was concluding that “Washington is clearly very perturbed by developments in Chile”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“Washington is clearly very perturbed by developments in Chile”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
As well as nationalisation of US business interests, \u201cthe United States must view the prospect of a moderately successful extreme left-wing regime in Chile with considerable misgiving if only because of the effect this might have elsewhere in Latin America\u201d, the JIC noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It also expressed the same fear from a British perspective, saying that the course of events in Chile is likely to have \u201cimportant repercussions throughout Latin American and perhaps beyond\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It added: \u201cAllende\u2019s victory has been hailed as strengthening the prevailing radical, anti-American trend in Latin America\u201d. It may lead to a bloc of \u201clike-minded states comprising Chile, Bolivia and Peru whose negative attitude towards foreign investment has already been demonstrated\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n RELATED<\/h3>\n \n \n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n \n How Britain plotted to spread homophobia in Cuba<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\nCovert action<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nThe CIA had initially sought to prevent Allende taking office. A declassified CIA report<\/a> reveals that throughout the 1960s and 1970s the US promoted \u201csustained propaganda efforts, including financial support for major news media, against Allende\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\nThis included \u201cpolitical action projects\u201d that \u201csupported selected parties before and after the 1964 elections and after Allende\u2019s 1970 election\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the 1960s, activities included financial assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, the distribution of posters and leaflets, and financial assistance to selected candidates in Congressional elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
By the time of the 1964 election, won by favoured US candidate Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party, the CIA had provided $3m to prevent Allende winning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the run-up to the 1970 election won by Allende, the CIA conducted \u201cspoiling operations\u201d to prevent his victory while President Nixon authorised the agency \u201cto seek to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
British planners in London and Santiago, Chile\u2019s capital, immediately set about forging good relations with the new military rulers as repression increased, even secretly conniving with the junta to mislead the British public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Officials were completely aware of the scale of atrocities. Three days after the coup, ambassador Reginald Second\u00e9 reported to the Foreign Office that \u201cit is likely that casualties run into the thousands, certainly it has been far from a bloodless coup\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“The extent of the bloodshed has shocked people”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Six days after, he noted that \u201cstories of military excesses and mounting casualties have begun increasingly to circulate. The extent of the bloodshed has shocked people\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But it did not appear to shock Second\u00e9 and his staff in Santiago. He immediately reported that \u201cwe still have enough at stake in economic relations with Chile to require good relations with the government in power\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But he suggested those good relations should be kept secret, writing: \u201cIt would not be in anyone\u2019s interests to identify too closely with those responsible for the coup\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Orderly government\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
After cabling London about casualties reaching into the thousands, Second\u00e9 further told the Foreign Office that \u201cwhatever the excesses of the military during the coup\u201d the Allende government had been leading the country into \u201ceconomic ruin\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, Britain should welcome the new rulers since “there is every reason to suppose that they will now\u2026 try to impose a period of sensible, orderly government”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Indeed, Second\u00e9 effectively condoned the political repression, noting that \u201cthe lack of political activity is, for the time being, no loss\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ambassador also told the Foreign Office that \u201cmost British businessmen\u2026 will be overjoyed at the prospect of consolidation which the new military regime offers\u201d. British companies, such as Shell, he added, \u201care all breathing deep sighs of relief\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The reference was to Allende\u2019s nationalisation campaign that had taken over some key Western commercial interests in the country, notably copper, the country\u2019s principal economic resource. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cNow is the time to get in\u201d, he recommended, while urging the British government to provide early diplomatic recognition of the new regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Better prospect\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The foreign secretary in Edward Heath\u2019s Conservative government, Alec Douglas Home, sent an official \u2018guidance\u2019 memorandum to various British embassies on 21 September outlining British support for the new junta. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It said: \u201cFor British interests\u2026 there is no doubt that Chile under the junta is a better prospect than Allende\u2019s chaotic road to socialism, our investments should do better, our loans may be successfully rescheduled, and export credits later resumed, and the sky-high price of copper (important to us) should fall as Chilean production is restored\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Indeed, the Foreign Office decided to go to extraordinary lengths to assure the Chilean junta of Britain\u2019s desire for good relations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“They are anxious to enter early into good relations with the new government”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Eleven days after the coup, Second\u00e9 met Admiral Huerta, the junta\u2019s new foreign minister. The ambassador\u2019s briefing notes for this meeting state that: \u201cI shall put it to him frankly that HMG [Her Majesty\u2019s Government] understands the problems which the Chilean armed forces faced before the coup and are now facing: this is a particular reason why they are anxious to enter early into good relations with the new government\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then Second\u00e9 said he would refer to \u201cour own problems of public opinion at home. It would therefore help us if he [ie, Huerta] could agree that we should be able to say something to reassure public opinion at home\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second\u00e9\u2019s record of his meeting with Huerta confirms that he said that the British government \u201cunderstood the motives of the armed forces, intervention and the problems facing the military government\u201d \u2013 diplomatic language for support for the junta. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The British ambassador then gave Huerta a draft form of wording to be used in public by the UK government, to which Huerta was asked to agree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Agreed statement<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
This agreed statement was an apologia for what the military junta was then doing, undertaken in order to placate public opinion in Britain. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It said Britain accepted that the internal situation in Chile \u201cis of course a matter for the Chilean government only\u201d and that the UK ambassador had expressed \u201cthe very strong feeling which exists in many quarters in Britain over the deaths of President Allende and others and over the many people arrested\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It added that \u201cthe Chilean government offered assurances that they will deal in a humane manner\u201d with those in detention and in political opposition \u2013 an obvious lie, since Second\u00e9 and Whitehall were perfectly aware of the scale of atrocities being committed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Douglas Home was delighted with Second\u00e9\u2019s success in reaching agreement with the junta on a form of words. He cabled the ambassador praising him for carrying out a \u201cdifficult brief\u201d, adding: \u201cThe statement helped us to defend our relatively early recognition of the new government against domestic criticism\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nRELATED<\/h3>\n
\n\n \n \n <\/a>\n <\/div>\n\nExclusive: Secret cables reveal Britain interfered with elections in Chile<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Proper perspective\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The removal of the democratically elected government was explained away by Second\u00e9. He said in a reflective 20 page dispatch three weeks after the coup that \u201cthe overthrow of constitutional government was not what it may seem in Britain\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
While he recognised that the armed forces were being widely condemned internationally \u201cthis must be put into its proper perspective\u201d, Second\u00e9 added. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
His analysis referred to the regular defeats Allende\u2019s government suffered in the Congress and the government\u2019s retention of power on the basis of the 36 per cent of the vote won by Allende in the 1970 presidential election, which, Second\u00e9 was convinced, would never happen in Britain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“The prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighter”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
As for the new military junta, Second\u00e9 noted that \u201ccircumstances also will push them into directions which British public opinion will deplore\u201d and \u201cthe next few years may be grey ones, in which freedom of expression may suffer\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBut this regime suits British interests much better than its predecessor\u201d, he concluded, adding: \u201cThe prospects for British business in Chile are clearly much brighter under the new regime\u2026 The new leaders are unequivocally on our side and want to do business, in the widest sense, with us\u201d\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was in the context of clear recognition by British planners that \u201ctorture is going on in Chile\u201d and also of the \u201callegedly quasi-fascist inclination of the new leaders\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was also recognised, as Second\u00e9 noted above, that the new regime was going to continue to be repressive for a long while. As one Foreign Office official noted: \u201cIt seems very hard to foresee a return for many years to anything like democratic government of the kind to which Chile has been accustomed for many years to come\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Aiding the regime<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Foreign minister Leo Amery made clear in private meetings with Judith Hart, Labour\u2019s shadow minister for overseas development, that the UK aid programme and credit lines would not be suspended, as some donors had done. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In reply to a parliamentary question, the Foreign Office drafted: \u201cOur priorities in Latin America are determined largely by our trading and investment interests\u2026 On the recent events in Chile, our public policy is to refuse to be drawn into the controversy of the rights or wrongs of President Allende\u2019s government or the new military government\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The issue of British arms exports to the junta was especially pertinent since Hawker Hunter aircraft supplied by Britain had been used in the coup to attack Allende\u2019s presidential palace and his residence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ambassador noted that \u201cHawker Hunters swept down with their aerial rockets, directed with remarkable accuracy at the palace, which was severely damaged and set on fire\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With the junta in power, British officials made clear that arms contracts agreed with Allende would be honoured, involving eight Hawker Hunters and other equipment worth over \u00a350m. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
But they went further, saying in the secret files that \u201cwe shall want in due course to make the most of the opportunities which will be presented by the change in government\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Expectations were for new requests for arms from the junta but \u201cwe shall wish to play these as quietly as possible for some time to come\u201d owing to widespread public opposition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Heath government defied calls from the Labour party to impose an arms embargo on Chile and all the Hawker Hunters had been delivered by the time of the 1974 British general election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A further major task was to counter the British and international opposition to the military regime\u2019s atrocities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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\u2018Atrocity stories\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
One extraordinary note by Foreign Office official Hugh Carless to Second\u00e9, in December 1973, stated that \u201cunfortunately, there is (as you have pointed out to us) a good deal of fact behind the atrocity stories and that alone makes it impossible for us to counter the propaganda\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe can do little about the press\u201d, he added \u201cbut you can assure them [the Chilean junta] that we and our ministers do understand the facts\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Carless also mused that \u201cChileans must be wondering why on Earth\u2026 so much unfair attention is being paid to their change of government\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
He continued by noting that due to the emergence of a worldwide Chile Solidarity Movement protesting against the new regime, \u201cwe shall, occasionally, have to adopt a lower profile than we would like\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was especially the case in providing arms, helping the junta with debt relief and to \u201crescue them from being pilloried in international meetings\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
‘Violent revolution’<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The impact of the coup on Chileans was harsh. But the removal of a popular government may also have had another effect beyond the country, signalling that a peaceful, democratic path to improving the position of the poor in a developing country would be met by violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ambassador Second\u00e9 noted in a dispatch after the coup that \u201cthe final seal of failure has now been put on this experiment by the Chilean armed forces\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“The final seal of failure has now been put on this experiment by the Chilean armed forces”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThis has some obvious advantages\u201d, he noted, but also disadvantages, one of which was that \u201cit will be widely concluded that violent revolution is the only effective way to communism\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Douglas Home similarly suggested that \u201cthe overthrow of Allende has ruined prospects for social change to be achieved democratically in Latin America\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Our major interest in Chile is copper\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A Foreign Office brief noted that \u201cour major interest in Chile is copper\u201d which accounted for one third of the UK\u2019s copper imports. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The disruption in Chile under Allende and \u201cfear for the future\u201d had recently meant large rises in copper prices which were costing the UK an extra \u00a3500,000 in foreign exchange. \u201cWe therefore have a major interest in Chile regaining stability, regardless of politics\u201d, the Foreign Office stated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Allende\u2019s primary heresy as seen from London and Washington was nationalisation. In July 1971 the copper industry \u2013 which provided 70 per cent of Chile\u2019s export earnings \u2013 was fully nationalised and the US-owned copper mines taken over by the government, with the unanimous approval of the Congress. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The US reacted sharply and cut off all credit and new aid to the government and pressed the World Bank to do the same. The chief US mining corporations, Kennecott and Anaconda, began legal proceedings against the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The US ambassador, Nathaniel Davis, told Reginald Second\u00e9 that the US government was concerned \u201cnot only about the loss to the copper companies, but also about the precedent that the Chilean action would set for the nationalisation of other big American interests throughout the developing world\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Several banks were also nationalised while in early 1972 the government announced its intention to take over 91 key firms which accounted for around half of Chile\u2019s economic output. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
A British Conservative Party briefing paper noted that UK companies had been affected by nationalisation \u201cbut it was generally considered at the time that where nationalisation of British assets had taken place the compensation agreed upon had been fair\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a despatch just eight days before the coup, Second\u00e9 admitted that Chile \u201c\u2018has at least caught her social problems by the tail: many people in the poorer and most depressed sections of the community have, as a result of President Allende\u2019s administration, attained a new status and at least tasted, during its early days, a better standard of living, though it has been eroded by inflation\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second\u00e9 concluded that \u201cthis is a major achievement and has set Chile apart from most other Latin American states\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nRELATED<\/h3>\n
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Threat of a good example<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Yet it was precisely because Allende\u2019s government was being successful that British and US planners wanted him to be removed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After being elected in 1970, Allende was appointed president of a Popular Unity government with the consent of the Christian Democratic Party. He inherited an economy that, as in most of Latin America, was controlled by a small elite. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In his victory speech in November 1970 Allende proclaimed a programme for fundamental economic change, proposing to abolish the monopolies \u201cwhich grant control of the economy to a few dozen families\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
He also pledged to abolish the tax system that favoured the rich, abolish the \u201clarge estates which condemn thousands of peasants to serfdom\u201d and \u201cput an end to the foreign ownership of our industry\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe road to socialism lies through democracy, pluralism and freedom\u201d, Allende proclaimed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The strategy was to create a restructured society based on state, mixed and private ownership of resources to be achieved mainly through the rapid extension of state control over large parts of the economy, either by direct nationalisation or government investment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
These policies improved the position of the poor, especially in the early part of the Allende presidency, through raising the minimum wage and special bonuses paid to poorly paid workers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was matched by rising popularity for the government; in congressional elections in the year of the coup, 1973, the Popular Unity coalition increased its vote to 44 per cent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nRELATED<\/h3>\n
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\u2018Redistribution of income\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Britain\u2019s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) recognised \u201cthe Allende government has been directing its economic efforts primarily at effecting a redistribution of income\u201d in which prices had been held down and salaries allowed to rise. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The strategy was \u201cto put right what they regard as economic and social injustices (including foreign domination of certain sectors of the economy)\u201d. Allende was \u201ccommitted to proving that socialism can be brought to Chile in a peaceful and democratic fashion\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Just three months after Allende assumed office, the JIC was concluding that “Washington is clearly very perturbed by developments in Chile”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“Washington is clearly very perturbed by developments in Chile”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
As well as nationalisation of US business interests, \u201cthe United States must view the prospect of a moderately successful extreme left-wing regime in Chile with considerable misgiving if only because of the effect this might have elsewhere in Latin America\u201d, the JIC noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It also expressed the same fear from a British perspective, saying that the course of events in Chile is likely to have \u201cimportant repercussions throughout Latin American and perhaps beyond\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It added: \u201cAllende\u2019s victory has been hailed as strengthening the prevailing radical, anti-American trend in Latin America\u201d. It may lead to a bloc of \u201clike-minded states comprising Chile, Bolivia and Peru whose negative attitude towards foreign investment has already been demonstrated\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\nRELATED<\/h3>\n
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Covert action<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The CIA had initially sought to prevent Allende taking office. A declassified CIA report<\/a> reveals that throughout the 1960s and 1970s the US promoted \u201csustained propaganda efforts, including financial support for major news media, against Allende\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This included \u201cpolitical action projects\u201d that \u201csupported selected parties before and after the 1964 elections and after Allende\u2019s 1970 election\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the 1960s, activities included financial assistance to the Christian Democratic Party, the distribution of posters and leaflets, and financial assistance to selected candidates in Congressional elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
By the time of the 1964 election, won by favoured US candidate Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party, the CIA had provided $3m to prevent Allende winning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the run-up to the 1970 election won by Allende, the CIA conducted \u201cspoiling operations\u201d to prevent his victory while President Nixon authorised the agency \u201cto seek to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n