In Kosovo, NATO allies blame depleted uranium for cancer cases<\/h2><\/a>\n READ MORE <\/i><\/a>\n <\/div>\n <\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n‘By message, and the means’<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nA letter<\/a> dated 15 <\/sup>April 1999 from Downing Street press secretary Alastair Campbell to Tony Blair\u2019s chief of staff Jonathan Powell, made clear that British planners considered \u201ccontrol and coordination\u201d of NATO\u2019s media campaign as vital.<\/p>\n\n\n\nCampbell stated this was \u201cbecause the propaganda battle is not just won by fact, but by message, and the means by which the message is deployed\u201d. In relation to Allied Force, he added that “the message is simple. This is a just cause. We are going to win”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n“Every big campaign requires a press article factory”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Campbell also proclaimed: \u201cThe key to message delivery is the creation of those events and stories. This requires making the most of what the military are doing\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cEvery big campaign requires a press article factory. Not a day should pass without us having authored or heavily influenced, comment\/editorial pieces in every major country\u201d, he continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Achieving best coverage\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIn tune with Campbell\u2019s modus operandi, a file<\/a> from earlier that month reveals that a “blitz of arguments and articles” had already been planned for national media by Campbell\u2019s deputy press secretary, Godric Smith.<\/p>\n\n\n\nOne proposal for the Sunday Telegraph<\/em>, read: “Chancellor Schr\u00f6der on why Germany felt it had to act\u201d and noted that \u201ccounterparts in Germany\u201d were \u201cin liaison with\u201d the Foreign Office. Another was for \u201can anonymised pilot in action over Kosovo for Saturday\u2019s Sun<\/em>\u201d, which was to be delegated to the \u201cMOD to process\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe files<\/a> show that strategy for UK regional media was to be coordinated by the MOD\u2019s director of information strategy and news, Oona Muirhead. Muirhead later described<\/a> her role as being \u201cbehind the scenes\u201d ensuring the \u201csystem worked\u201d and that the MOD\u2019s \u201cmedia operation operated effectively\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\nEfforts were made to identify “key regional editors to be targeted” for briefing, “feeder services” for local radio pieces, and \u201c\u2019talking heads\u2019 with local credibility\u201d for TV. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here, the government’s opaque Strategic Communications Unit was to provide \u201ckey contacts\u201d and support toward “achieving best coverage”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Editorial control\u2019 <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIn a letter<\/a> in early April, Britain\u2019s chief of defence staff, Sir Charles Guthrie, pleaded with NATO supreme commander Wesley Clark that British politicians be permitted \u201cto engage the enemy on the public relations front with sufficient ammunition\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\nBy the end of that month, British efforts in this area escalated, the documents indicate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
A letter<\/a> from the chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Michael Pakenham, assured Blair\u2019s foreign affairs adviser, John Sawers, that the Foreign Office “put substantial effort” into increasing news broadcasting to Serbia.<\/p>\n\n\n\nIn addition to more BBC World Service broadcasting, the files note increased output from British Satellite News (BSN), with BSN daily news slots \u201cunder FCO [Foreign Office] editorial control\u201d being \u201cretransmitted by Montenegrin television\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Established in 1992 and self-described<\/a> as “a free television news and features service”, BSN operations were entirely funded by the Foreign Office. <\/p>\n\n\n\nThe service was designed to project a \u201cBritish perspective\u201d of world events, and its content is reported<\/a> to have been in use by 400 news channels globally by 2003.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A letter<\/a> dated 15 <\/sup>April 1999 from Downing Street press secretary Alastair Campbell to Tony Blair\u2019s chief of staff Jonathan Powell, made clear that British planners considered \u201ccontrol and coordination\u201d of NATO\u2019s media campaign as vital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Campbell stated this was \u201cbecause the propaganda battle is not just won by fact, but by message, and the means by which the message is deployed\u201d. In relation to Allied Force, he added that “the message is simple. This is a just cause. We are going to win”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Every big campaign requires a press article factory”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Campbell also proclaimed: \u201cThe key to message delivery is the creation of those events and stories. This requires making the most of what the military are doing\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEvery big campaign requires a press article factory. Not a day should pass without us having authored or heavily influenced, comment\/editorial pieces in every major country\u201d, he continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In tune with Campbell\u2019s modus operandi, a file<\/a> from earlier that month reveals that a “blitz of arguments and articles” had already been planned for national media by Campbell\u2019s deputy press secretary, Godric Smith.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One proposal for the Sunday Telegraph<\/em>, read: “Chancellor Schr\u00f6der on why Germany felt it had to act\u201d and noted that \u201ccounterparts in Germany\u201d were \u201cin liaison with\u201d the Foreign Office. Another was for \u201can anonymised pilot in action over Kosovo for Saturday\u2019s Sun<\/em>\u201d, which was to be delegated to the \u201cMOD to process\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The files<\/a> show that strategy for UK regional media was to be coordinated by the MOD\u2019s director of information strategy and news, Oona Muirhead. Muirhead later described<\/a> her role as being \u201cbehind the scenes\u201d ensuring the \u201csystem worked\u201d and that the MOD\u2019s \u201cmedia operation operated effectively\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Efforts were made to identify “key regional editors to be targeted” for briefing, “feeder services” for local radio pieces, and \u201c\u2019talking heads\u2019 with local credibility\u201d for TV. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, the government’s opaque Strategic Communications Unit was to provide \u201ckey contacts\u201d and support toward “achieving best coverage”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a letter<\/a> in early April, Britain\u2019s chief of defence staff, Sir Charles Guthrie, pleaded with NATO supreme commander Wesley Clark that British politicians be permitted \u201cto engage the enemy on the public relations front with sufficient ammunition\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By the end of that month, British efforts in this area escalated, the documents indicate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A letter<\/a> from the chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Michael Pakenham, assured Blair\u2019s foreign affairs adviser, John Sawers, that the Foreign Office “put substantial effort” into increasing news broadcasting to Serbia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to more BBC World Service broadcasting, the files note increased output from British Satellite News (BSN), with BSN daily news slots \u201cunder FCO [Foreign Office] editorial control\u201d being \u201cretransmitted by Montenegrin television\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Established in 1992 and self-described<\/a> as “a free television news and features service”, BSN operations were entirely funded by the Foreign Office. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The service was designed to project a \u201cBritish perspective\u201d of world events, and its content is reported<\/a> to have been in use by 400 news channels globally by 2003.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
\u2018Achieving best coverage\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\u2018Editorial control\u2019 <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n